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Uganda: No More Pro-poor Growth? 
 
Robert Kappel, Jann Lay and Susan Steiner∗ 
 
This article explores changing growth regimes in Uganda, from pro-poor 
growth in the 1990s to growth without poverty reduction, actually even 
with a slight increase in poverty, after 2000. Not surprisingly, it finds that 
good agricultural performance is the key determinant of direct pro-poor 
growth in the 1990s, while lower agricultural growth is the root cause of 
the recent increase in poverty. At the same time, after 2000 low 
agricultural growth appears to have induced important employment shifts 
out of agriculture, which have dampened the increase in poverty. The 
article also assesses the indirect form of pro-poor growth by analysing the 
incidence of public spending and the tax system, and finds that indirect 
pro-poor growth has been achieved to only a limited extent. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The degree of poverty reduction following growth differs remarkably across countries 
and over time.1 Pro-poor growth is therefore a useful concept that allows for classifying 
growth patterns into those that lead to poverty reduction and those that do not. Growth 
on its own is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for poverty reduction. In that 
sense, growth is good for the poor, and the empirical literature supports this proposition. 
Pro-poor growth, however, is about how good growth is for the poor. If it is 
appropriately defined, pro-poor growth can be considered a sufficient condition for 
poverty reduction. 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000) define pro-poor growth as growth that ‘enables the 
poor to actively participate in and significantly benefit from economic activity’. Along 
these lines, Klasen (2003) suggests that there are two possible ways to achieve pro-poor 
growth. The direct way implies that growth is pro-poor if it immediately raises the 
incomes of the poor, or, in other words, if growth occurs in those sectors and/or regions 
where the poor are employed and uses the factors of production they possess. It is 
widely accepted that growth has to be strong in agriculture and non-farm rural and 
informal sector activities in order to be pro-poor. It must be labour-intensive and land-
intensive, and it must be concentrated in localities with high poverty rates. The indirect 
way suggests that growth is pro-poor if the gains from overall economic growth are 
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redistributed to the poor via progressive taxation and targeted government spending. 
This spending can take the form of either direct financial transfers or investment in the 
assets of the poor by providing basic social services. While financial transfers 
immediately increase the disposable income and thus welfare of the poor, investment in 
their assets is the clearly preferable option as this enables the poor to better participate 
in and benefit from economic activities sustainably without making them dependent on 
welfare programmes. 
Yet, understanding pro-poor growth does not only depend on a proper definition of 
the concept, but also on its adequate practical operationalisation. In the latter regard, 
this article seeks to make a contribution to the empirical literature on pro-poor growth 
by exploring whether or not growth has translated into poverty reduction in the case of 
Uganda between 1992 and 2002. The Ugandan economy has experienced high 
economic growth rates since 1986, and the growth record can be roughly divided into 
two periods, namely, post-war recovery and economic reforms (Collier and Reinikka, 
2001; Dijkstra and van Donge, 2001). Following the predations of Idi Amin and three 
other transient presidents, accompanied by civil war, mass murder, and mass emigration 
of skilled workers, the economy recovered quickly after the current President Yoweri 
Museveni took power in 1986. Subsequently, GDP grew by an annual 6.1% between 
1986 and 1990, and GDP per capita growth amounted to 3.0% during the same period. 
However, there was little capital accumulation, and growth stemmed mainly from 
increases in productivity, which in turn were due to the reactivation of production 
capacities that had been unused during the years of war and to the return of the flight 
capital of Ugandan-Asian entrepreneurs (Berthélemy and Söderling, 2001). 
After this period of recovery, it was Uganda’s reform programme that triggered 
high GDP growth. The highly committed government of the National Resistance 
Movement stabilised and liberalised the economy. Inflation was reduced from more 
than 100% in 1987 to single-digit figures by 1992, the trade regime was liberalised, and 
the marketing boards for coffee, tea and cotton were abolished. These economic reforms 
were accompanied by important institutional reforms, such as the restructuring of public 
administration and decentralisation. In addition to these internal factors, favourable 
world market prices for coffee, Uganda’s main export product, and high inflows of 
official development aid played an equally important role in achieving growth rates well 
above the sub-Saharan average. Between 1990 and 2000, annual GDP growth amounted 
to 6.3% on average, slightly higher than in the late 1980s. However, it slowed down 
somewhat during the second half of the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium. 
The Ugandan case is particularly interesting for the pro-poor growth debate, as 
high economic growth rates have coincided with remarkable poverty reduction during 
the 1990s, but not in recent years. Based on household survey data, this article first 
illustrates changing growth regimes from pro-poor growth between 1992/3 and 
1999/2000 to growth without poverty reduction, actually even with an increase in 
poverty, between 1999/00 and 2002/3. We then attempt to shed some light on the 
factors behind this change in growth patterns by looking at the direct way of achieving 
pro-poor growth. In doing so, we focus on the sectoral dimension of growth and its link 
to poverty reduction. As noted above, the assessment of the direct way of pro-poor 
growth is only part of the story, at least when relatively short time horizons, in our case 
only 10 years, are taken into account. We therefore also assess the indirect way of 
achieving pro-poor growth by analysing the incidence of public spending and the tax 
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system. Finally, we conclude by summarising our main results and formulating some 
policy recommendations in the context of pro-poor growth in Uganda. 
 
2 From pro-poor growth to growth without poverty reduction 
 
Household survey data2 illustrate that the good macroeconomic performance of Uganda 
has been translated into broad-based growth of consumption during the course of the 
1990s, whereas after the turn of the century growth appears to have favoured mainly the 
rich. Thus, when measured in terms of consumption, poverty decreased considerably 
between 1992/3 and 1999/00 (Appleton, 2001a, b; Deininger and Okidi, 2003; Okidi et 
al., 2000). Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, however, poverty has risen slightly despite 
continued growth. In what follows, we take a closer look at the evolution of poverty and 
inequality over the past ten years. 
Table 1 shows trends in poverty and inequality between 1992/3 and 2002/3. 
National poverty measured by the headcount declined from 55.7% to 37.7% during this 
period.3 The poverty gap, which gives an idea of the resources needed to lift the poor 
out of poverty by perfectly targeted transfers, also decreased substantially from 20.3% 
to 11.3%. This substantial improvement is reflected in both rural and urban areas. In 
rural areas, the headcount index declined from 59.7% in 1992/3 to 41.7% in 2002/3, and 
in urban areas, it fell from 27.6% to 12.2%.4 Yet, poverty reduction has not been a 
steady but rather a volatile process, with little change in the early 1990s, much of the 
increases in consumption of the poor occurring in the second half of the decade 
(Appleton, 2001b), and the recent setback. 
 
Table 1: Poverty and inequality, 1992-2002 
 
 Poverty headcount Poverty gap Gini coefficient 
 1992/3 1999/00 2002/3 1992/3 1999/00 2002/3 1992/3 1999/00 20002/3 
National 55.7 33.8 37.7 20.3 10.0 11.3 0.364 0.395 0.428 
Urban 27.6 9.6 12.2 8.1 2.1 3.0 0.394 0.426 0.477 
Rural 59.7 37.4 41.7 22.0 11.2 12.6 0.325 0.332 0.363 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UBOS household survey data. 
 
Measured by the Gini coefficient, inequality increased slightly from 0.364 to 0.395 
over a period of seven years and then jumped to 0.428 in only three years. 
Disaggregating these figures into rural and urban inequality yields worrying insights 
into the growing disparities in Uganda. Within rural areas, inequality remained fairly 
                                                          
2. For all calculations in this article, we use data from three household surveys obtained from the Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics (UBOS): the Integrated Household Survey (HIS) of 1992/3, the Uganda National 
Household Survey (UNHS) of 1999/00 and the Second Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS II) of 
2002/3. 
3. In all our calculations, we use the official (per adult equivalent) consumption aggregate provided by 
UBOS based on the excellent work of Simon Appleton. For details, see the technical appendix in Appleton 
(2001a). We also use official poverty lines as documented in Appleton (2003). 
4. It is important to point out here that about 86% of the Ugandan population were living in rural areas in 
2002/3, which is why rural poverty contributed 96% of national poverty. 
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stable throughout the 1990s. Within urban areas, inequality had even decreased up to 
1997/8 (Appleton, 2001b) but by the end of the decade reached a level slightly higher 
than in 1992/3. Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, however, inequality rose substantially 
within both rural and urban areas, the increase being more pronounced in urban areas. 
In addition, the data show that rural-urban disparities widened during the 1990s. As 
decompositions of the Theil index reveal, the proportion of total inequality that can be 
attributed to the inequality between rural and urban areas (as opposed to the inequality 
within rural and urban areas respectively) increased from 16% in 1992/3 to 23% in 
1999/00. As seen above, inequality increased sharply within rural and urban areas in 
recent years, which led to a lower contribution of the inter-inequality component of 
20% in 2002/3. 
We have dedicated some considerable space to the evolution of inequality in 
Uganda, as it represents a crucial link between growth and poverty reduction. First, the 
initial level of inequality matters, as growth will have a relatively small poverty-
reducing effect with a highly unequal distribution. In economies where inequality is 
persistently low, the poor will tend to obtain a relatively higher share of the gains from 
growth (Ravallion and Datt, 1999). Second, changes in the distribution make growth 
either more or less effective in reducing poverty. If, for example, only the upper 
segments of the income distribution gain from growth, growth will not lead to poverty 
reduction at all. And third, the part of the distribution that changes has an influence on 
whether or not distributional shifts are in favour of or against the poor. In order to be in 
favour of the poor, income has to be redistributed from the non-poor to the poor and not 
among the poor or among the non-poor. 
In the following, we intend to shed some more light on the relationship between 
consumption growth, inequality, and poverty in Uganda. An excellent tool to illustrate 
this relationship is growth incidence curves, which plot consumption growth at 
consumption percentiles (Ravallion and Chen, 2003). Figure 1 provides national growth 
incidence curves for the periods 1992/3 to 1999/00 and 1999/00 to 2002/3. In the first 
period, growth was broad-based, as all parts of the population experienced positive 
growth in consumption. The annual percentage increase in per adult equivalent 
consumption lay between 4 and 9%, with increases for the highest percentiles (90th and 
above) much more pronounced than for lower percentiles. Yet in the second period, 
growth only amounted to between minus 2 and 3%, with consumption declining for 
large parts of the population.5 Only for the upper 20 percentiles, growth turned out to be 
positive, and the richer people were the more they gained. 
 
                                                          
5. National accounts report an annual per capita growth rate of 2.0% at the national level between 1999/00 
and 2002/3, which is different from the growth rate of 0.6% that we derived from household survey data 
for the same period. Appleton (2001b) illustrates that in the case of Uganda growth estimates from 
household surveys differ quite substantially from growth rates in national accounts for short time periods 
but are consistent if the longer period between 1992/3 and 1999/00 is considered. At this point, we do not 
want to elaborate on this question. For a discussion of discrepancies and reconciliation of data from 
household surveys and national accounts, see Deaton (2003) and Pyatt (2003). Still, the discrepancies 
arising in growth rates remind us of the pitfalls of both data sources. As our main concern is poverty, we 
are inclined to rely on survey data rather than national accounts. 
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Figure 1: Growth incidence curves, national 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UBOS household survey data. 
 
The poverty-growth nexus has proved to differ considerably between rural and 
urban areas in Uganda. As Figures 2 and 3 show, both rural and urban growth were 
broad-based between 1992/3 and 1999/00. At 7.8%, however, annual growth in mean 
consumption in urban areas was much stronger than in rural areas, where consumption 
grew by 4.8% annually (Table 2). In rural areas, people up to the 40th percentile 
benefited more from growth than the rest of the population, except for the extreme 
upper end of the distribution. This is in line with the relatively constant Gini coefficient 
for that period. In urban areas, on the contrary, better-off people gained more than the 
poor. Nevertheless, the poor experienced important increases in consumption that 
explain the strong decrease in urban poverty rates. 
 
Figure 2: Growth incidence curves, rural 
 
Source: Ibid. 
 
The growth incidence curves for the period from 1999/00 to 2002/3 reveal a 
dismal picture. Rural (urban) average consumption grew by only 0.12 (1.16)% a year 
(Table 2). Nearly all people experienced negative consumption growth. In rural areas, 
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only people above the 85th percentile benefited from growth, while people between the 
15th and the 60th percentiles lost most (up to 2% annually). With regard to urban areas, 
the growth incidence curve exhibits a small peak around the 90th percentile, implying 
that there is an upper-income class that saw its consumption levels increase moderately. 
At the very top end of the distribution, people gained substantially, so that most of the 
total increase in mean consumption can be attributed to the few households of the 
highest percentiles. The rest of the urban population suffered a dramatic loss in terms of 
consumption of up to 7% annually. In contrast to rural areas, the poorest of the poor in 
urban areas appear to have fared particularly badly. 
 
Figure 3: Growth incidence curves, urban 
 
Source: Ibid. 
 
Besides this graphical representation, the literature offers different measures of 
pro-poor growth. One of them is the ‘rate of pro-poor growth’ as proposed by Ravallion 
and Chen (2003). It can be interpreted as the area under the growth incidence curve up 
to the headcount index at the start of the respective period.6 A positive rate of pro-poor 
growth reflects that growth has been pro-poor, as this implies that the poor (as defined 
in the base year) have gained in consumption. If the rate of pro-poor growth exceeds the 
growth rate in the mean, distributional shifts have been in favour of the poor, who have 
then benefited relatively more from growth than the rest of the population. In the case of 
Uganda, growth was unambiguously pro-poor between 1992/3 and 1999/00 (Table 2). 
In rural areas, distributional shifts even favoured the poor, though only marginally. 
Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, the rate of pro-poor growth was negative. Hence, growth 
then clearly benefited the rich, which confirms our findings from the above. 
A different tool for assessing the link between growth, inequality and poverty is 
decomposing poverty changes into growth and inequality components (Datt and 
Ravallion, 1992). The growth component indicates how much of the total change in 
poverty can be attributed to economic growth in the absence of distributional changes. 
If growth was positive, this component will be negative, implying that equally 
distributed growth will always reduce poverty. The inequality component shows how 
                                                          
6. It is calculated as the ratio of the change in poverty over time (using the Watts index) to the change that 
would have been observed had the distribution remained unchanged times the growth rate in the mean. 
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much of the poverty change can be traced back to changes in inequality keeping mean 
consumption constant. This component can either be positive or negative, depending on 
whether the distributional shifts have been against or in favour of the poor. The growth 
and inequality components do not add up to the total poverty change if mean 
consumption and the distribution change simultaneously, which in reality is always the 
case. The decomposition analysis thus provides growth and distribution components as 
well as a residual.7 
 
Table 2: Annual growth in mean consumption  
and rate of pro-poor growth 
 
 National Urban Rural 
 1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
Rate of pro-poor growth 4.99 -1.65 6.60 -3.84 4.86 -1.63 
Growth rate in the meana 5.62 0.57 7.80 1.16 4.85 0.12 
Note: a) Note that the growth rate in the mean reported here appears to be somewhat underestimated. As 
explained above, computing the rate of pro-poor growth uses the poverty line as an anchor. In the case of 
Uganda, there is no national poverty but only regional lines that take regional differences with regard to 
non-food requirements into account (Appleton, 2001b). It is assumed that people in urban areas need to 
make more non-food expenditures for a decent standard of living, assigning higher poverty lines to urban 
areas. When we calculate the rate of pro-poor growth and the growth rate together, we end up deflating 
twice for regional differences (first for price differences, which are included in the consumption aggregates 
we use, and second for difference in non-food requirements). This, however, deflates already comparable 
per adult equivalent consumption more in urban than in rural areas, which is why the resulting growth rate 
in the mean is too low. If, for example, we calculate national growth rates without deflating consumption 
for regional poverty lines, we get a growth rate of 5.91% for the period 1992/3 and a rate of 0.66% for 
1990/00-2002/3. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UBOS household survey data. 
 
Table 3 shows results for a decomposition of the annual change in poverty in 
Uganda. Between 1992/3 and 1999/00, national poverty decreased by an annual 3.1 
percentage points, urban poverty by 2.6 points and rural poverty by 3.2 points. At the 
national level, the growth component amounted to -3.5 points, implying that poverty 
would have decreased by more than it actually did had the distribution remained 
unchanged. The distributional component takes the value of 0.6, which suggests that 
distributional shifts in this period were against the poor. Yet, as the growth component 
clearly dominates the distributional component, poverty reduction achievements were 
only slightly hampered by increasing inequality. The same holds when urban and rural 
changes in poverty are considered separately.8 
                                                          
7. See Datt and Ravallion (1992) for details on the interpretation of the residual. 
8. Note that the positive distributional component for rural areas contradicts our finding above. The rate of 
pro-poor growth indicated pro-poor, or at least not anti-poor, distributional shifts in rural areas in this 
period. The reason for the contradiction lies in the fact that the decomposition analysis assesses changes in 
the headcount index, whereas the calculation of the rate of pro-poor growth is based on the Watts index. 
The latter poverty measure satisfies the transfer axiom, i.e., inequality-reducing transfers among the poor 
lead to a decrease in the index. As we can infer from the growth incidence curve, inequality among the 
poor decreased between 1992/3 and 1999/00. Yet, these pro-poor distributional shifts are not taken into 
account in the decomposition analysis, which in turn leads to the positive distributional component. 
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Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, poverty rose by an annual 1.3 percentage points at 
the national level, 0.9 points in urban areas and 1.4 points in rural areas. Since mean 
consumption growth was positive, the growth components turn out to be negative. But 
compared with the previous period, the poverty-reducing potential of distributionally 
neutral growth is much lower, as suggested by the smaller growth component. This is, 
of course, due to the relatively low consumption growth in the mean at national, urban 
and rural levels during this period, as seen in Table 2. Distributional components again 
are positive and hence anti-poor. But, in contrast to the above, they dominate the growth 
components, thus explaining the increase in poverty in recent years. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of annual poverty change  
into growth and distributional components 
 
 National Urban Rural 
 1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
1992/3-
1999/00 
1999/00-
2002/3 
Poverty change -3.13 1.30 -2.57 0.86 -3.19 1.41 
Growth component -3.49 -0.44 -2.91 -0.40 -3.17 -0.10 
Distributional component 0.63 1.72 0.74 1.27 0.24 1.50 
Residual -0.27 0.01 -0.40 -0.01 -0.26 -0.01 
Note: Figures are given as percentage points. 
Source: Ibid. 
 
In sum, we find that the Ugandan growth experience between 1992 and 2002 can 
be distinguished into two different regimes. During a first period (from 1992/3 to 
1999/00), growth was broad-based with substantial consumption increases for the whole 
population, which in turn led to poverty reduction. As consumption growth was higher 
in urban areas and for the richer segments of the population, total inequality and 
inequality between urban and rural areas increased. Nevertheless, the growth effect on 
poverty clearly dominated the distributional effect, so that growth in this period can 
unambiguously be considered pro-poor. In the following period (from 1999/00 to 
2002/3), however, growth in mean consumption turned out to be much lower and most 
segments of the population saw their consumption decline. Only the rich experienced 
positive growth, both in rural and in urban areas. In consequence, inequality at national, 
rural and urban levels increased sharply, and the distributional effect on poverty now 
dominated the growth effect. This growth regime is in stark contrast to the previous one 
and leaves no sign of pro-poor growth. 
 
3 The direct way: sectoral growth, structural change and 
poverty reduction 
 
Pro-poor growth requires the sectoral pattern of growth to be biased in favour of the 
poor. In Uganda, the majority of the poor population live in rural areas and are engaged 
in agricultural activities, as urbanisation occurs only slowly. Therefore, growth 
obviously has to be strong in agriculture to reduce poverty effectively. In fact, 
agricultural growth in the 1990s was strong enough to achieve the magnitude of poverty 
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reduction described in the preceding section. Yet, other sectors have grown by much 
higher rates, which implies that the Ugandan economy has experienced considerable 
structural change since the early 1990s. The agricultural sector accounted for 38% of 
GDP in 2002/3, down from about 48% in 1992/3, and employed about 67% of the 
workforce in 2002/3, a decrease of 13 percentage points compared with 1992/3.9 
However, structural change has not only altered the sectoral composition of production 
and employment away from agriculture. There have also been important changes within 
the agricultural sector. As we illustrate in the following, both developments have had a 
strong impact on poverty. 
The upper part of Table 4 provides sectoral poverty profiles and a decomposition 
of poverty changes into changes due to intrasectoral effects, intersectoral effects, also 
referred to as population-shift effects, and interaction effects.10 Intrasectoral effects are 
the changes in overall poverty that result from poverty changes within a specific sector. 
Population-shift effects are the changes in overall poverty that can be attributed to 
people moving between sectors, e.g. from a sector with high poverty incidence into a 
sector with lower poverty incidence. The interaction effect describes the correlation 
between intrasectoral and population effects. It thus reflects poverty changes that are 
due to people moving between sectors where poverty is falling or rising. For the 
decomposition exercise, all members in the household were assigned the household 
head’s sectoral affiliation. 
In 1992/3, almost 70% of the population lived in households where the household 
head was engaged in agricultural activities, and this was still the case in 1999/00. 
According to the 2002/3 survey, this share recently declined to less than 60%. In 
1992/3, around 3% of households were mainly engaged in non-crop agriculture, 
including livestock production, but the share of the population living in such households 
rose to more than 5% in 2002/3.11 As Table 4 indicates, the poverty incidence among 
crop-agriculture households in the early 1990s was very high. According to Appleton 
(2001b), food-crop and cash-crop households were equally poor in 1992/3. The 
situation of food-crop households did not change much until 1995/6, and only between 
1995/6 and 1999/00 did they start to catch up. Cash-crop households already fared 
better in the early 1990s, and poverty among these households was significantly reduced 
by 1995/6. A further, though less impressive, reduction followed thereafter. 
Table 4 illustrates that crop-agriculture was the most important contributor to 
poverty reduction in the 1990s, i.e. the reduction of poverty within this sector was the 
main contributor to overall poverty reduction (intrasectoral effect). In contrast, between 
1999/00 and 2002/3 crop-agriculture was by far the most important contributor to the 
observed increase in poverty, as the headcount in this sector increased by more than 10 
percentage points. Yet, as its population share went down by more than 10 percentage 
points, the intersectoral contribution worked in the opposite direction (illustrated by the  
                                                          
9. Employment shares are authors’ calculations based on household survey data. Shares in GDP are taken 
from several issues of the Key Economic Indicators published by UBOS. 
10. For details on the decomposition techniques, see Ravallion and Huppi (1992). 
11. Unfortunately, the 2002/3 survey does not allow us to further disaggregate the agricultural sector. Only the 
1992/3 and 1999/00 surveys included agricultural modules that provide the necessary information for such 
a disaggregation. Because of the lack of comparability over time, we have not analysed these agricultural 
modules and borrow from Appleton (2001b) for the analysis of sectoral shifts within crop agriculture. 
Table 4: Decomposition of poverty changes 
 
 
 Population share Poverty headcount Intrasectoral effect Population- 
shift effect 
Interaction effect 
 1992 1999 2002 1992 1999 2002 1992-99 1999-02 1992-99 1999-02 1992-99 1999-02 
Sector of household head             
Crop agriculture 66.3 67.6 52.2 63.8 39.1 50.4 -16.38 7.64 0.83 -6.02 -0.32 -1.74 
Non-crop agriculture 2.9 3.2 5.5 54.9 41.9 33.6 -0.38 -0.27 0.16 0.96 -0.04 -0.19 
Mining 0.1 0.5 0.2 31.5 41.5 26.2 0.01 -0.08 0.13 -0.12 0.04 0.05 
Manufacturing  3.9 2.9 7.1 44.6 23.3 28.5 -0.83 0.15 -0.45 0.98 0.21 0.22 
Public sectora 3.7 1.9 1.6 35.1 20.5 11.2 -0.54 -0.18 -0.63 -0.06 0.26 0.03 
Construction 1.4 1.5 1.8 36.6 20.1 22.6 -0.23 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.01 
Trade and transportb 8.8 9.4 16.8 27.8 12.9 17.6 -1.31 0.44 0.17 0.95 -0.09 0.35 
Miscellaneous services 6.7 8.1 9.2 34.2 14.5 18.8 -1.32 0.35 0.48 0.16 -0.28 0.05 
Not working 6.2 4.9 5.7 56.9 42.3 39.1 -0.91 -0.16 -0.74 0.34 0.19 -0.03 
Total effect       -21.88 7.94 -0.02 -2.75 -0.04 -1.26 
Diversification of household activityc             
Only agriculture 53.6 51.1 40.5 64.8 41.1 53.2 -12.70 6.18 -1.62 -4.36 0.59 -1.28 
Agriculture and other 27.8 30.8 29.1 50.8 29.6 32.3 -5.89 0.83 1.52 -0.50 -0.64 -0.05 
No agriculture 13.8 14.4 26.0 29.0 12.3 18.4 -2.30 0.88 0.17 1.43 -0.10 0.71 
Not active 4.8 3.7 4.4 59.7 51.1 45.3 -0.41 -0.21 -0.66 0.36 0.09 -0.04 
Total effect       -21.31 7.68 -0.58 -3.08 -0.05 -0.66 
Residence in coffee districtd             
Yes 44.6 43.3 47.4 52.9 25.8 31.3 -12.09 2.38 -0.69 1.06 0.35 0.23 
No 55.4 56.7 52.6 58.0 39.9 43.5 -10.03 2.04 0.75 -1.64 -0.24 -0.15 
Total effect       -22.11 4.42 0.07 -0.58 0.12 0.08 
Subsistence households             
Subsistence household 33.1 32.0 24.5 59.2 39.9 52.8 -6.39 4.13 -0.65 -2.99 0.21 -0.97 
Non-subsistence 66.9 68.0 75.5 54.0 30.9 32.8 -15.45 1.29 0.59 2.32 -0.25 0.14 
Total effect       -21.84 5.42 -0.06 -0.68 -0.04 -0.83 
Notes: Total poverty reduction 1992/3-1999/00 was 21.9 percentage points and poverty increased by 3.9 percentage points 1999/00-2002/3. a) includes public utilities and 
public administration; b) includes communications; c) diversification of household activity refers to dependence of households on agriculture and other activities. It includes 
household heads’ main and secondary activities and other household members’ main activity; d) districts included are (according to 1992 disaggregation): Kalangala, 
Kapchorwa, Kiboga, Luwero, Masaka, Mpigi, Mubende, Mukono, Rakai, Mbale, Kamuli, Iganga and Bushenyi. These are districts with actual coffee production per capita 
of more than 20 bags of 60kg or production potential of more than 100,000 bags of 60 kg. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UBOS household survey data. 
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negative sign of the population-shift effect). The explanation is straightforward. By 
moving out of crop-agriculture, people moved out of a sector with a high poverty 
incidence compared with other sectors. The interaction component is also negative, 
which is due to the fact that people moved out of a sector where poverty was rising. 
With regard to non-crop agriculture, the picture is somewhat different. Between 1992/3 
and 1995/6, poverty in this sector was reduced remarkably. In contrast to poverty in the 
cash-crop and food-crop sectors, it increased slightly between 1995/6 and 1999/00 
(Appleton, 2001b), but has decreased significantly since 2000 (Table 4). Yet, non-crop 
agriculture still exhibits a relatively high poverty incidence of 34%, and since this 
coincides with a rising population share, the intersectoral contribution of this sector is 
positive, i.e. it has contributed to the overall poverty increase. 
Table 4 nicely reflects how activities other than agriculture are gaining importance 
in the Ugandan economy. Sectors like trade, transport and other services employed 
household heads representing 26% of the population in 2002/3, up from 15.5% in 
1992/3. Employment in manufacturing declined in the 1990s, but grew remarkably in 
recent years. Between 1992/3 and 1999/00, households whose household head worked 
in manufacturing, public sector activities, trade, and other services (the most important 
non-agricultural activities) contributed significantly to poverty reduction. Among trade 
and public sector households, the poverty incidence was more than halved in this 
period. Manufacturing households started from higher poverty levels, and poverty 
declined somewhat less. After 1999/00, the poverty incidence among manufacturing 
households remained more or less constant; the positive intersectoral contribution 
resulted from the higher share in employment. Trade households accounted for almost 
17% of the Ugandan population in 2002/3, which implies that their share has almost 
doubled in recent years. The poverty incidence among these households remained fairly 
low, although it rose somewhat recently. These factors explain the sector’s relatively 
low contribution to the poverty increase between 1999/00 and 2002/3. The sectoral 
decomposition thus illustrates that the poverty changes in the 1990s were almost 
entirely due to intrasectoral gains, in particular in agriculture, whereas since 1999/00 
movements between sectors have also played an important role in determining poverty 
outcomes. Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, the total intersectoral and interaction effects 
were negative, i.e. people moved out of sectors with relatively high poverty incidence, 
or where poverty was rising. This finding implies that poverty outcomes could have 
been a lot worse, had people stayed in agriculture. 
However, the sectoral decomposition analysis suffers from the possibly important 
drawback that it does not consider the composition of household income. Households 
are classified according to the main occupation of the household head. This implies that 
the intersectoral changes of other household members are not taken into account. In 
addition, the intrasectoral gains or losses of other household members are implicitly 
contributed to the household head’s sectoral choice. Indeed, there have been major 
changes in household income composition beyond the main occupation of the 
household head. Deininger and Okidi (2003) report that almost 50% of all households, 
and almost one-third in rural areas, started a non-agricultural enterprise between 1988 
and 1992/3, most of them in the trade sector. 
In Table 4, we present some evidence that supports this finding, as that in 1992/3 
only around 50% of the population relied exclusively on agricultural activities for their 
livelihood. The poverty headcount among diversified households was significantly 
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lower than the headcount of ‘pure’ agricultural households. Until 1999/00, the 
population share in pure agricultural households had declined only very little and 
poverty had been reduced considerably. Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, we observe a 
decline of more than 10 percentage points in the population share of pure agricultural 
households and a corresponding increase of non-agricultural households. The poverty 
incidence among the remaining pure agricultural households increased considerably. 
There was also a marked increase of the headcount of non-agricultural households, 
whereas poverty among diversified households increased only slightly. It thus appears 
that those households moving out of agricultural activities have not been as successful 
as their predecessors in doing so. In addition, diversified households seem to have been 
able to cope better with the unfavourable conditions that led to the overall poverty 
increase.12 
Despite the declining importance of agriculture in terms of production and 
employment, the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated that agricultural performance 
remains the key determinant of Uganda’s success in terms of economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Therefore, we shortly review growth and structural change within 
this sector from the early 1990s until today in more detail and try to link these 
developments to the observed poverty changes. The restoration of peace and the public 
sector, and the liberalisation of agricultural markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
provided the framework for a reversal of the retreat to subsistence and the rehabilitation 
of traditional export products in Ugandan agriculture. Economic reforms in the 
agricultural sector predominantly affected the cash-crop sector, as there were no 
interventions in the food-crop sector (Dijkstra and van Donge, 2001). The deregulation 
of the coffee market, which had been dominated by the state-owned Coffee Marketing 
Board (CMB) until the beginning of the 1990s, can be considered as one of the key 
reforms.13 With regard to the supply response of the cash-crop sector to these reforms, 
there is no consensus in the literature. Whereas Belshaw et al. (1999) conclude that 
coffee and cotton production had failed to recover mainly because of institutional 
resistance to the reforms, Dijkstra and van Donge (2001) find that there have been 
important supply responses that can be linked to liberalisation. Deininger and Okidi 
(2001) support the latter finding for the cotton sector. They also note that all agricultural 
sectors have benefited from a better functioning of rural factor markets, as land rental 
transactions have increased significantly and access to credit has improved. Extension 
services today reach a higher share of farms and facilitate diversification, in particular 
in the food-crop sector. 
                                                          
12. It should be noted that our analysis intends to identify tendencies and trends by using descriptive methods. 
A detailed analysis of changes in household income-generation processes goes well beyond the scope of 
this article, but would certainly be a worthwhile undertaking. 
13. See, for example, Belshaw et al. (1999) and Dijkstra and van Donge (2001) for detailed assessments of 
agricultural reforms and outcomes. 
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Figure 4 shows cumulative production growth for several agricultural subsectors.14 
We also introduced a curve for manufacturing for illustrative purposes. Whereas 
production in well-performing agricultural sectors nearly doubled between 1991/2 and 
2002/3, it almost tripled in manufacturing.15 Yet, Uganda started from a pretty small 
manufacturing base. With regard to growth within the agriculture sector, Figure 4 
provides a clear message. Monetary agriculture fared quite well, with production almost 
doubling over a decade, whereas non-monetary agriculture grew significantly less. Only 
in livestock production, non-monetary agriculture grew stronger than monetary 
agriculture. Overall, these agricultural production growth rates are in line with the 
household-survey-based evidence.16 
 
Figure 4: Production in agricultural subsectors, 1992/3-2002/3 
(Production of monetary agriculture in 1991/2 = 100) 
 
 
Production of cash-crop agriculture increased strongly in the early 1990s and at a 
somewhat lower rate in recent years. According to Dijkstra and van Donge (2001), 
production quantities of coffee, cotton and tobacco increased considerably. Increasing 
production quantities coincided with favourable cash-crop prices until the mid-1990s. 
During the coffee price boom of 1995/6 and 1996/7, growth rates of cash-crop 
production were two-digit. Yet, coffee prices (robusta) started to fall after 1998, hitting 
the bottom in November 2001, down almost 90% from their highest levels in August 
                                                          
14. The data on agricultural production in Uganda are certainly of questionable quality, in particular for food-
crop production. Dijkstra and van Donge (2001) report that they had been told by the Ministry of 
Agriculture that official statistics on food production are best guesses. We think that an informed best 
guess can still be used in empirical work. Actually, the following analysis shows that the data appear to 
reflect household survey findings quite well. Furthermore, we believe that data quality has improved in the 
course of the 1990s, based on our experiences with household survey data and our contacts with UBOS 
staff. 
15. Trade more than doubled, transport almost tripled during the same time period. 
16. In this paragraph we have considered the value of production only. In the following, we also examine 
quantities and prices separately. Nevertheless, the term production always refers to values. 
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1994.17 In addition, prices for cotton, tobacco, and tea also fell between 1998/9 and 
2001/2 (MFPED, 2003). Increased production quantities appear to have partly 
compensated for decreasing prices. Despite some volatility in growth rates in cash-crop 
production, which are not very well captured by Figure 4, the sector has performed 
quite well, with an annual growth rate of 6.7% between 1992/3 and 2002/3. Yet, 
average annual growth between 1999/00 and 2002/3 was only 2.2%. 
Agricultural households are vulnerable to such agricultural commodity price 
shocks, as household income diversification is still low. Appleton (2001a) argues that 
the increase in export prices for coffee and the liberalisation of the coffee sector 
(leading to higher prices for coffee farmers) allowed farmer households to benefit 
directly from the increase in world prices. Yet, this implies that in turn coffee farmers 
were negatively affected by the recent drop in coffee prices. Deininger and Okidi (2003) 
simulated price changes and their effects on poverty. They found that a price increase of 
10% for coffee, the main tradable, would result in a reduction of the headcount by 6 
percentage points, thus illustrating the high elasticity of poverty with respect to coffee 
prices. A downward shift of coffee prices of 10%, in view of the linear character of the 
regression, would lead to poverty increases of slightly more than 6 percentage points. 
Unfortunately, the 2002/3 household survey data do not allow for the identification of 
coffee growers in order to test Deininger and Okidi’s claim. Yet, in order to assess 
broadly the poverty impact of the end of the coffee boom, we classify Ugandan districts 
into coffee and non-coffee districts. The results, reported in Table 4, appear to confirm 
the important role of the coffee sector. Coffee districts contributed more to the overall 
poverty reduction than non-coffee districts between 1992/3 and 1999/00, but they also 
contributed slightly more to the recent poverty increase, despite their lower population 
share. 
Figure 4 shows that monetary food-crop production increased considerably in the 
1990s. During the same period, non-monetary food-crop production has either grown 
much less, or has stagnated or even declined. Both curves flatten in recent years, 
reflecting a general decrease in food prices. Non-monetary food-crop production has 
virtually stagnated (despite high population growth), whereas monetary food-crop 
agriculture appears to have compensated for the price decrease somewhat by producing 
more. Overall, Figure 4 clearly indicates that a greater share of agricultural production 
is marketed, which could be due to farmers, who already participated in markets, 
producing and selling more and/or increasing market participation. Yet even today, only 
about 55% of agricultural production is sold on markets. Larson and Deininger (2001) 
find that farmer participation increased in the course of the 1990s, although they note 
that the evidence is ambiguous. The diversification of food-crop production has 
certainly been conducive to increasing market participation. Deininger and Okidi (2001) 
report that many farmers started growing non-traditional crops, such as tomatoes, 
cabbage and fruit, during the 1990s. However, the low growth rates of non-monetary 
agricultural production are certainly not entirely due to ‘subsistence’ farmers moving 
into monetary agriculture. Instead, they also reflect the problems and limitations that 
these subsistence farmers face. 
Indeed, we find that the share of the population living in subsistence households, 
defined as households with a ratio of home-produced food to household food 
                                                          
17. Prices for Ugandan coffee growers from the International Coffee Organisation (www.ico.org). 
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consumption of more than 0.7, declined only a little between 1992/3 and 1999/00 (Table 
4). Between 1999/00 and 2002/3, however, this share went down from 32 to 24.5%. 
Note that this decrease may not only point to increased market participation but also be 
attributed to households switching into non-agricultural activities. Starting from a 
headcount index of 54%, poverty among non-subsistence households was reduced to 
30.9% by 1999/00, which compares with a reduction from 59.2 to 39.9% for subsistence 
households. Non-subsistence households thus fared much better in the 1990s and, 
despite their increasing population share, poverty rose only slightly among these 
households in recent years. Poverty among the remaining subsistence households, 
however, increased massively, which contributed considerably to the overall observed 
poverty increase. 
As mentioned above, the non-monetary livestock sector even outperformed the 
monetary livestock sector. Continuing high growth in this sector is in line with the result 
of the sectoral poverty analysis, that the livestock sector is among the few sectors in 
which poverty was reduced between 1999/00 and 2002/3. Deininger and Okidi (2001) 
report that livestock ownership had increased significantly during the 1990s and our 
results suggest that this favourable development may have continued in recent years. 
Primary sector products figure prominently in Uganda’s development plans. In 
addition to coffee, cotton, Irish potatoes and livestock, the Strategic Interventions for 
Export Promotion programme of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED) identifies fish and horticulture as key subsectors for initiating 
export-led growth. Even though production in these subsectors is still low compared 
with the other agricultural subsectors already discussed, they already play an important 
role in generating export earnings: Fish exports have become as important as coffee 
exports, and horticultural (in particular flower and vanilla) exports have grown 
remarkably – though from a low base – to account for approximately 10% of total 
export earnings today. Some of the non-traditional export products, such as vanilla and 
cocoa, are partly produced by small-scale farmers, whereas fish production is mostly 
small-scale. Cut roses and chrysanthemum plant cuttings as well as fruits and vegetables 
are almost exclusively produced by large farmers, as they generally require significant 
capital investment. Typically, these farms offer high-quality employment, and in 
addition, they may subcontract small farmers.18 
Unfortunately, we know very little about the link between the performance of 
these dynamic agricultural subsectors and poverty. Employment modules of the 
household surveys are not disaggregated enough to extract information about the 
evolution of employment and income generation in these sectors, and hence about their 
impact on household welfare.19 The anecdotal evidence presented so far suggests that 
export booms in some agricultural subsectors might have benefited the smallholders. It 
is certain, though, that not enough farmers have moved into these non-traditional 
subsectors and that employment generation on large farms has not been sufficient to 
make a difference in terms of poverty reduction. 
                                                          
18. Vanilla, for example, was grown by more than 10,000 smallholders, whereas in floriculture only 20 firms 
employed 4,000 workers. Both figures are for 2000 from IDEA Project (2001). 
19. The analysis of the agricultural module of the UNHS can possibly contribute to a better understanding of 
these developments, at least with regard to the question of how smallholders have benefited from the 
above-mentioned positive developments in agriculture. 
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To sum up, the analysis of the link between the pattern of growth and poverty 
reduction presented here yields the following major insights. Growth in agriculture was 
the basis of Uganda’s poverty reduction achievement in the 1990s. It was accompanied 
by important structural change within agriculture towards a better market integration of 
farmers. In addition, households diversified into non-agricultural activities. Despite 
lower growth rates reported for non-monetary agriculture, subsistence farmers also 
appear to have benefited from the favourable conditions. This is not necessarily in 
contradiction to the lower growth rates of non-monetary agriculture, as this subsector 
grew despite increasing market participation. Non-agricultural households fared 
particularly well and diversified households also benefited from high growth rates in 
non-agricultural sectors. The coffee boom of the mid-1990s also played an important 
role in reducing poverty. Slow growth in non-monetary agriculture as well as the end of 
the coffee boom seem to be the key factors behind the increase in poverty after 2000. At 
the same time, important changes in the employment structure and the composition of 
household incomes have occurred. Poverty among subsistence farmers, who have not 
been able to participate in markets or diversify into other economic activities increased 
massively. Declining incomes in agricultural activities have possibly induced the 
observed structural change. Structural change has apparently cushioned the poverty 
effect of slow agricultural growth, but it may also have put some pressure on the returns 
from non-agricultural activities. In turn, declining returns in non-agricultural activities 
may have caused the poverty increase among non-agricultural households. This 
relatively strong increase is particularly worrying, as it might be interpreted as a sign of 
an emerging non-agricultural subsistence or informal sector. 
 
4 The indirect way: public spending, taxation, and poverty 
reduction 
 
In this section, we examine Uganda’s experience with the indirect linkage between 
economic growth and poverty reduction. As pointed out above, high economic growth 
provides opportunities for both static and dynamic redistribution. The indirect way 
implies the adoption of a progressive tax system and targeted government spending on 
the poor. Taxes have the potential to directly correct an unequal distribution of market 
incomes. Together with development aid, they provide the resources required for public 
expenditures, which can take the form of either financial transfers or public services. 
Transfers can immediately benefit the poor by increasing their disposable incomes. 
Public services can increase the welfare of the poor by improving their living 
conditions. But maybe more importantly, they can be considered an investment in the 
assets of the poor, providing an opportunity to increase their earning capacities and to 
change the distribution of incomes in the medium to long run. Hence, here we address 
the question of whether public spending in Uganda is targeted towards the poor and 
whether the tax system is progressive.  
With regard to public spending, our analysis concentrates on an assessment of 
public service delivery, as there is no social security net that reaches the poor.20 In line 
                                                          
20. The government provides pension payments only for civil servants and army officials. The private 
National Social Security Fund offers pension, invalidity, and survivor’s benefits to qualified private sector 
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with the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which constitutes the government’s 
major development plan to actively combat poverty, the provision of public services has 
become more and more focused on poverty reduction since the mid-1990s. In the course 
of elaborating the PEAP, five priority areas had been identified: primary education, 
primary health care, rural road rehabilitation and maintenance, agricultural 
modernisation, and water supply and sanitation. It was assumed that providing these 
services would help improve the living conditions of the poor and enable them to 
participate better in economic activities. Hence, it was determined that public 
expenditures for each of these priorities should increase by at least as much as nominal 
GDP (Kempaka and Obwona, 2000). The introduction of the Poverty Action Fund 
(PAF) in 1998 has played an important role in securing this commitment. By way of 
channelling savings from debt relief, donor contributions, and domestic resources 
towards priority areas of spending, the PAF has contributed to a significant reorientation 
of budget allocations towards pro-poor service delivery. Over the past years, the share 
of allocations to programmes covered by the PAF grew rapidly in both relative and 
absolute terms (Williamson and Canagarajah, 2003).  
Yet, this does not say anything about who benefits from the delivery of priority 
services. It may indeed be the better-off segments in society that benefit from an 
increased provision of education, health care, or roads, making the potential impact of 
these services on poverty rather marginal. A suitable tool to get to the bottom of this 
question is benefit incidence analysis, which measures the distribution of benefits of 
public spending on social services to individuals or households. It combines information 
about the unit cost of providing services with information on their use. In other words, it 
imputes to those households using a particular service the cost of providing it, therefore 
considering the amount by which household income would have to increase if it had to 
pay for the service itself.21 In the following, we shall conduct benefit incidence analyses 
for the education and health sectors, given their unquestioned relevance for poverty 
reduction. 
According to the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the Ugandan 
government spent USh 229,430 million on primary, USh 68,650m. on secondary, and 
USh 48,900m. on tertiary education in the financial year 2002/3. These numbers refer to 
budget releases for recurrent expenditure (wage and non-wage) and include spending by 
both the central and local governments. Local governments are responsible for the 
provision of education apart from tertiary education. In order to calculate the unit cost 
of providing public education, total costs have to be matched with user numbers. Table 
5 shows the number of students enrolled in public, private, and NGO, religious or 
community schools as reported in the UNHS II.22 In terms of enrolment numbers, NGO, 
religious and community schools do not play a substantial role in primary, secondary, or 
                                                                                                                                              
employees. But even though this fund is open to informal sector workers, the vast majority of members, if 
not all, are employed in the formal sector. For more details, see McDonald et al. (1999). 
21. Excellent surveys of origins and refinements of the methodology as well as case studies are given in 
Selden and Wasylenko (1992), Younger and Sahn (2000) and Younger (2003). For instructions on how to 
use it, see Demery (2000). 
22. Enrolment is reported as total enrolment regardless of a person’s age. We chose to do so because in many 
cases children start school relatively late. In theory, primary school age is 6-12, secondary school age 13-
19, and tertiary school age 20-25. Yet, in the UNHS II the average age for primary school is 10.4 years, for 
secondary 17.3 years, and for tertiary 23.8 years. 
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tertiary education. With regard to primary education, enrolment is highest in public 
schools for all consumption quintiles. Yet, it stands out that, with increasing 
consumption, households are more likely to send their children to private than to public 
schools. As far as secondary education is concerned, enrolment of children from poorer 
households decreases heavily compared with children from better-off households. This 
effect is even more pronounced in tertiary education where students from the fifth 
quintile account for nearly 70% of all students. Considering the Ugandan policy of 
offering public primary education free of charge – known as Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) – while public secondary and tertiary education has to be paid for, this 
enrolment pattern suggests that school fees represent a significant burden for 
households from lower quintiles, many of whom make use of UPE but cannot afford to 
send their children to secondary school or higher. 
 
Table 5: Number of students in primary, secondary,  
and tertiary school, 2002/03 
 
Quintile  
  Primary  
 Public Private Other 
1 1,538,165 35,767 41,868 
2 1,475,546 106,893 39,634 
3 1,378,868 165,800 59,218 
4 1,178,492 257,532 27,435 
5 742,820 433,292 31,718 
 Secondary 
 Public Private Other 
1 28,936 18,761 1,877 
2 50,342 48,458 8,116 
3 82,850 102,431 1,894 
4 107,889 114,051 4,924 
5 118,596 149,645 13,186 
 Tertiary 
 Public Private Other 
1 206 207 964 
2 1,432 621 558 
3 3,694 927 750 
4 9,098 3,012 131 
5 22,229 23,222 2,846 
Note: Other refers to religious, NGO, community and other institutions. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UBOS household survey data. 
 
Combining public spending on education with enrolment in public schools results 
in a unit transfer amount of Ush 36,337 per student per year in primary schools, Ush 
176,654 in secondary schools, and Ush 1,333,915 in tertiary institutions. The 
distribution of benefits from public education spending in terms of per capita transfers 
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per quintile is presented in Table 6. Quintile shares in total spending are also reported.23 
Considering that the poverty headcount amounted to 38% in 2002/3, our findings 
suggest that spending on primary education benefits the poor more than the non-poor. 
The two lowest quintiles receive higher per capita transfers than other quintiles, and, in 
fact, transfers decrease with increasing consumption. As could be expected, this does 
not hold for spending on secondary and tertiary education, from which the non-poor 
benefit more than the poor, and the richest gain most. These findings are, of course, 
heavily influenced by the fact that total enrolment in public institutions is much higher 
for the poor in primary education, while it is higher for the non-poor in secondary and 
tertiary education. In other words, since the number of children from poor households in 
public primary schools is significantly higher than the number of children from better-
off households, it is quite clear that the poor benefit relatively more from public 
spending on primary education. Looking at education spending as a whole, per capita 
transfers are distributed relatively evenly but still increase with households’ 
consumption. Overall, the poor receive smaller than average per capita transfers from 
education spending.24 
 
Table 6: Benefit incidence of public spending on education, 2002/3 
 
Quintile Primary Secondary Tertiary All 
 Per 
capita 
transfer 
Share 
in 
subsidy 
Per capita 
transfer 
Share 
in 
subsidy 
Per 
capita 
transfer 
Share 
in 
subsidy 
Per 
capita 
transfer 
Share 
in 
subsidy 
1 11,060 24.36 1,011 7.45 54 0.56 12,126 17.66 
2 10,596 23.37 1,757 12.95 377 3.91 12,730 18.57 
3 9,914 21.84 2,896 21.32 975 10.08 13,786 20.08 
4 8,485 18.67 3,776 27.76 2,405 24.82 14,666 21.33 
5 5,341 11.76 4,146 30.52 5,867 60.64 15,354 22.36 
Total 9,080 100.00 2,717 100.00 1,935 100.00 13,732 100.00 
Note: Per capita transfers are defined as the unit cost times the number of students enrolled in school divided 
by the population in each quintile. 
Source: Ibid. 
 
With regard to public health expenditure, the MTEF reports Ush 40,750m. for 
hospitals, and Ush 59,390m. for primary health facilities in 2002/3. Again, this includes 
money spent by the centre and by local governments; the latter are in charge of all 
health services except referral hospitals. As Table 7 reveals, public health facilities 
coexist with privately run services as well as health units led by NGOs or religious 
                                                          
23. Since unit costs are assumed to be equal among quintiles, these shares correspond to the proportion of the 
number of students from a particular quintile enrolled in total enrolment. 
24. Note that our results point out a remarkable improvement in the targeting of public education spending 
over the past few years. An unpublished study by the World Bank (1996) found that expenditures for 
primary education were relatively evenly distributed between quintiles at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
distribution of secondary education benefits was found to be highly regressive, with a share of the first 
quintile in total expenditure of only 4%. 
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institutions, and all of them are attended by the population – yet with some differences.25 
As far as treatment in hospitals is concerned, public facilities are by far the most 
frequented, followed by NGO or religious hospitals. Private hospitals do not play a 
significant role in terms of user numbers, which is most likely because of the high fees 
charged by them. As regards primary health care, however, people prefer to seek 
treatment in private facilities, and this holds even for the poor. But similarly to the case 
of education, the probability of attending private facilities increases with households’ 
consumption levels. In addition, it stands out that total user numbers in both hospitals 
and primary health units increase with consumption as well. Since it is not plausible that 
poorer people are less likely to fall sick, this suggests that the poorer an individual the 
less likely he or she is to seek treatment. 
 
Table 7: Type of health facility attended in past month, 2002/3 
 
Quintile  
  Hospital  
 Public Private NGO/religious 
1 108,279 6,298 18,702 
2 128,355 5,652 27,764 
3 121,789 10,737 24,262 
4 128,627 7,509 29,327 
5 136,429 20,875 62,356 
 Primary health 
 Public Private NGO/religious 
1 310,919 335,794 19,192 
2 263,607 400,784 14,937 
3 220,902 496,971 27,489 
4 169,483 646,390 35,180 
5 152,240 749,104 30,935 
Note: Primary health facilities comprise clinics, dispensaries, and health centres. 
Source: Ibid. 
 
Extrapolating monthly user numbers in public facilities to annual user numbers 
and combining them with public health spending, the unit cost for hospitals amounts to 
Ush 4,704 and that for primary health facilities to Ush 4,430.26 Table 8 shows the 
distribution of benefits from public spending on health across quintiles. For primary 
care, the poor receive higher per capita transfers than the non-poor, and, in fact, the 
                                                          
25. The UNHS II also reported attendance at drug shops, pharmacies, traditional doctors and others. But these 
types of health care are not listed here because they play only a minor role compared with hospitals and 
primary health units. 
26 Note that in the calculation of the unit cost for hospital care, a distinction between indoor and outdoor 
hospital patients has been made. The UNHS II recorded around 525,000 outdoor and 98,000 indoor 
patients in public hospitals per month. In order to account for different cost structures between an inpatient 
day and an outpatient visit, we doubled the number of inpatients, thereby treating an inpatient day as twice 
as expensive as an outpatient visit. In their benefit incidence study on education and health spending in 
Indonesia, Lanjouw et al. (2001) assumed a cost ratio of 1:10. Applying such a high ratio does not change 
the basic message of our analysis. Nevertheless, the higher inpatient costs are treated relative to outpatient 
costs, the more per capita transfers for the different quintiles diverge (Steiner, 2004). 
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transfers fall steadily with households’ increasing consumption levels. In the case of 
hospital care, however, the poor benefit less than the non-poor, receiving below-average 
per capita transfers. Looking at health in general, the first and second quintiles clearly 
receive above-average per capita transfers. This implies that the poor benefit more from 
health spending than the non-poor. 
In sum, our findings suggest that benefits from public spending are relatively well 
distributed in the case of health but not so much in the case of education. Focusing on 
the poverty priority areas, primary education and primary health care, however, we have 
to acknowledge that the government is successfully targeting its spending in both 
sectors and reaching the intended group. Nevertheless, even if the poor have access to 
primary schools and primary health facilities, this does not necessarily lead to a long-
term reduction in poverty. There is quite considerable evidence that, in both education 
and health, the quality of services has been sacrificed for an increase in quantity. Low 
quality, however, can seriously inhibit the effectiveness of public spending, which may 
then fail to improve the living standards of the poor and to increase their human capital. 
 
Table 8: Benefit incidence of public spending on health, 2002/3 
 
Quintile Hospitals Primary health care All 
 Per capita 
transfer 
Share in 
subsidy 
Per capita 
transfer 
Share in 
subsidy 
Per capita 
transfer 
Share in 
subsidy 
1 1,346 16.69 3,271 27.83 4,617 23.30 
2 1,583 19.66 2,769 23.60 4,352 22.00 
3 1,655 20.52 2,324 19.77 3,979 20.08 
4 1,631 20.20 1,785 15.17 3,416 17.22 
5 1,849 22.92 1,602 13.63 3,451 17.41 
Total 1,613 100.00 2,350 100.00 3,963 100.00 
Source: Ibid. 
 
As far as education is concerned, it is reported that the quality of public schools 
has become unsatisfactory in recent years (MFPED, 2000). This is mainly due to the 
fact that the dramatic increase in enrolment rates, which has followed the introduction 
of UPE,27 has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the number of teachers, 
classrooms and textbooks. In the health sector, the situation is not very different. Since 
the abolition of user fees for public health services in 2001, the utilisation of these 
services has increased considerably but the number of health workers, as well as the 
stock of medical equipment and drugs, remain insufficient. Recruitment of qualified 
staff appears to be difficult, in particular in remote areas (Opolot, 2001). Incidents of 
corruption at the local government level make the abiding problem of low funding and 
                                                          
27. Pfaffe et al. (2003) report that, following the introduction of UPE, primary enrolment numbers increased 
from 2.7 million children in 1997 to 7.2 million children in 2002. Yet, this early success is today being put 
into perspective as a substantial proportion of students who have enrolled in primary class since 1997 drop 
out of school before finishing the regular seven years of education. The New Vision, one of Uganda’s daily 
newspapers, reported on 21 May 2004 that, out of the total number of students who enrolled in 1997, only 
22% passed Primary Leaving Examinations in 2003. 
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scarce financial resources even worse (MFPED, 2002). As a consequence, people who 
can afford to pay for education and health services prefer private or NGO to public 
facilities (Hutchinson, 2001), which is confirmed by the user numbers reported above. 
As already mentioned, the indirect way of pro-poor growth not only refers to the 
question of targeted government spending but also to the progressiveness of the tax 
system. In other words, pro-poor growth requires that taxes are designed in such a way 
that they burden the rich more than the poor. Similar to the case of public spending, this 
question is best addressed by tax incidence analysis. Chen et al. (2001) have recently 
conducted such an analysis for Uganda, and we briefly summarise their findings here. 
The authors compared the progressiveness of taxes at the beginning and the end of the 
1990s in order to account for changes in the tax system. During the last decade, 
comprehensive and substantial tax reforms were implemented, which changed the 
composition of tax revenue considerably. First, taxes on international trade were shifted 
from export to import taxation. As initially high import tax rates were lowered over 
time, ad valorem excise taxes were imposed on selected imports in order to compensate 
for parts of the revenue loss. Second, the 12-30% sales tax on the sale of goods and 
selected services was replaced by a common 17% value-added tax in order to broaden 
the tax base and improve compliance. And third, a new Income Tax Act was adopted, 
which ascribed graduated income tax rates to corporations and individuals (Gauthier 
and Reinikka, 2001; IMF, 2003). 
Chen et al. (2001) showed that, with the exception of some excise taxes and 
graduated personal tax, which is an income tax levied by local governments, taxes had 
been progressive at the beginning of the decade. In particular, the excise tax on 
kerosene, which is heavily consumed by the poor, was found to be highly regressive. 
Graduated personal tax also turned out to hit the poor relatively hard as its threshold 
was about half the lower threshold of the central government income tax on individuals. 
Being levied on formal sector employees and hence on the better-off, this pay-as-you-
earn income tax was the most progressive tax. At the end of the decade, taxes remained 
largely progressive, the central government income tax again being the most 
progressive one. The findings indicate that the tax reforms made excise taxes more 
progressive and import duties more regressive. The latter finding is most likely due to 
the introduction of duty-free treatment of imported capital goods for all firms in 1995. 
The excise tax on petroleum was found to be particularly progressive. As the authors 
point out, this finding should be treated with caution. If the indirect effects of the 
petroleum taxes were taken into account, excise taxes might turn out to be more 
regressive. Since taxing petroleum consumption affects transport prices and hence final 
consumer prices of all types of goods, people in rural areas and thus the poor are likely 
to be hurt disproportionately. 
This example points to the limitations of this type of tax incidence analysis. In 
addition, it is based on the formal tax structure only. If the analysis were instead based 
on taxes actually paid, the above findings could change substantially. In an economy 
with a large rural and informal sector like Uganda, there is good reason to believe that 
numerous businesses and individuals do not pay taxes at all. For example, there is 
evidence that tax exemptions and tax evasion are widespread among firms. While tax 
exemptions appear to be more common among larger firms, tax evasion is especially 
prevalent among smaller firms (Gauthier and Reinikka, 2001). If this were taken into 
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account, the resulting tax incidence could move in either direction depending on the 
extent of the tax burden resting on smaller firms.  
While it is possible that poor people pay less tax than the formal tax system 
suggests, it is equally possible that they pay more. This can best be illustrated by the 
case of local taxation, which is steeply regressive in practice, even if not in intention 
(Bahiigwa et al., 2004). Graduated personal tax, for example, is supposed to be levied in 
proportion to an individual’s income, but in fact it is often applied at a flat rate of Ush 
3,000 for all individuals, regardless of their income. This makes the tax even more 
regressive than indicated by Chen et al. (2001). The same holds for local market dues, 
which are imposed in many localities as flat rates on small and large quantities alike 
(Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003). Clearly, this practice places a relatively high burden on 
individuals with low incomes as well as on small businesses. This burden appears to be 
so significant that people consider local taxation a discouraging factor for local 
businesses and even a cause of poverty (MFPED, 2002). 
Let us summarise the main findings of our assessment of the indirect way of pro-
poor growth. Benefit incidence analysis suggests that, in general, the poor benefit from 
public spending on health and to a somewhat lesser extent on education. In particular, 
they benefit from spending on primary education and primary health care, both poverty 
priority areas of the Ugandan government. These types of spending are expected to have 
a relatively large impact on poverty reduction. But in practice the impact appears to be 
severely limited by the low quality of public services in Uganda. Both the education and 
health sectors suffer from a grossly inadequate human resource base as well as 
insufficient financial resources. Besides, our findings reveal that the non-poor benefit 
remarkably more from spending on secondary and tertiary education as well as 
hospitals. Highly worrying are the low secondary and tertiary enrolment numbers 
among the lower quintiles. The tax system is found to be progressive in principle, but 
current taxing practice puts this into question. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
Between 1992/3 and 2002/3, the Ugandan population experienced important welfare 
gains in terms of consumption. During the 1990s, consumption increases were broad-
based, distributional shifts were only slightly negative or even pro-poor, and thus 
growth significantly reduced poverty. Growth was clearly pro-poor, although the gains 
were not equally distributed across the country, as urban-rural disparities increased. 
After 2000, however, the number of the poor rose from 7 million to 9 million within 
only three years, due to both lower growth and a worsening of the income distribution. 
This setback seriously reduces Uganda’s chances of achieving its goal of reaching a 
poverty level of 10% or less by 2017. The period of pro-poor growth was thus followed 
by a period of low growth without poverty reduction. In this article, we have analysed 
how the changing pattern of growth affected poverty outcomes, but we have said little 
about why the growth pattern changed. The article should therefore also be regarded as 
an invitation to further research, in particular on agricultural performance and its link to 
the dynamics of household income generation in Uganda.    
Analysing the link between the pattern of growth and poverty, or the direct way of 
pro-poor growth, we find that strong agricultural growth, which was accompanied by 
important structural change within the agricultural sector, in particular increased market 
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participation, was the main driver of poverty reduction in the 1990s. Diversification into 
non-agricultural activities enabled many households to benefit from the high growth 
rates in these sectors. The period between 1999/00 and 2002/3 is characterised by a 
downturn in agriculture, in particular in non-monetary agriculture. Possibly as a 
response to the unfavourable conditions in agriculture, major shifts in the employment 
structure could be observed, which may have dampened the poverty increase. In 
addition, our analysis yields the following insights. First, poverty among subsistence 
households increased considerably, as these households probably had no means of 
responding to the adverse conditions in agriculture. Second, the pronounced increase of 
poverty among non-agricultural households points to the emergence of a non-
agricultural subsistence sector. 
The vulnerability of subsistence farmers has, of course, been identified as a 
possible source of poverty before, which is why the Plan for the Modernisation of 
Agriculture (PMA), Uganda’s policy package for the agricultural sector formulated in 
2000, explicitly focuses on this group. The policies of the PMA are thus intended to 
lead to an integration of subsistence farmers into markets. Our results might be regarded 
as support for this focus. Yet, we agree with Bevan et al. (2003) who call for a more 
integrated approach, as the current PMA lacks a coherent strategy towards the rest of 
the agricultural sector. Uganda’s development strategy towards the productive sector 
rightly focuses on the agricultural sector, but off-farm activities also deserve attention. 
Many households have already moved out of agriculture, and it can be expected that this 
trend will continue or even accelerate in the future. It is crucial for further poverty 
reduction that these people find employment in productive jobs. 
Regarding the indirect way of pro-poor growth, we find that the Ugandan 
government has made notable progress in investing in the assets of the poor. Yet, we 
conclude that, until quality concerns about the delivery of public services and 
shortcomings in the tax administration are resolved, indirect pro-poor growth can only 
be achieved to a very limited extent. In particular, the current situation of primary 
education cannot be regarded as satisfactory. High enrolment rates in public primary 
schools have to be accompanied by an improved quality of education. Improvements at 
the local level appear to be key, given that many quality concerns about public service 
delivery as well as problems in revenue collection could be traced back to the low 
capacity of local authorities. In addition, the incentive structure of public service 
delivery must be reviewed. Teachers, health workers, and extension workers should be 
attracted to remote areas by offering them higher salaries, or some other type of 
compensation. 
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